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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
Christine Jackson appeals from an order entered on
December 15, 1995, denying her petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.

These habeas corpus proceedings arise in the aftermath

of Jackson's conviction on July 2, 1992, at a bench trial in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.

At

that trial, the court found Jackson guilty of possession of a
controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to deliver.

It subsequently sentenced her to a

term of four to eight years' imprisonment.
The state trial judge made the following findings of
fact in a written opinion denying Jackson's post-trial motions:
1.On December 16, 1988, at approximately 10:00 p.m.,
officers from the Philadelphia Police
Department executed a search warrant for
Jackson's apartment. The search warrant was
executed based on information from an
informant who claimed to have worked for two
people, John and Len, who had drugs in the
apartment.
2.Jackson was the lessee of the apartment, and admitted
that she had a younger brother named John who
also lived in the same apartment.
3.The apartment had a living space consisting of a
combination living room, dining room, and
kitchen, in addition to two bedrooms.
4.Jackson and her son, who shared one bedroom, were
present during the search.
5.In the rear bedroom, the police found an ice chest
belonging to Jackson which contained 41 clear
bags each containing approximately 40 clear
plastic vials filled with crack cocaine, and
14 clear bags each containing approximately
20 plastic packets of cocaine. There were
approximately 297 bags and 1,683 vials. The
total weight of the crack/cocaine was in
excess of 250 grams.
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6.The police also found a heat sealer, scale, loaded
.38 calibre handgun, and loaded .9 mm handgun
in the rear bedroom.
7.In a kitchen cabinet, the police found two scales and
a heat sealer. In a closet next to Jackson's
bedroom, the police found a duffel bag filled
with thousands of empty vials and packets,
and a loaded shotgun.
8.The rear bedroom, kitchen cabinets, and closet were
not locked.
9.Jackson admitted to using the kitchen cabinets and
the closet.
10.Police found proof of residency for the apartment in
the form of a telephone bill, an electric
bill, and a lease, all of which named
Jackson.
11.An expert witness, if called, would have testified
that the amount of illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia found in the apartment were
indicative of possession with the intent to
deliver, rather than mere possession.
Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 8901-0957 (Pa. C.P. Jan. 22, 1993).
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that
(1) Jackson had access to all areas of the apartment, including
the rear bedroom, (2) the amount of illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia found in the apartment demonstrated that they were
possessed with intent to deliver, and (3) Jackson was a willing
participant in the drug dealing occurring in her apartment.
Jackson appealed her conviction to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court which affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 638 A.2d

268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (table).

She then obtained allocatur

from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which affirmed her conviction
by an equally divided court.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 659 A.2d.
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549 (Pa. 1995) (table).

She asked for relief on appeal on the

sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction.
Jackson thereafter filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
On November 15, 1995, a magistrate judge issued a report
recommending that the district court deny the petition and find
that there was no probable cause to appeal.

On December 15,

1995, the district court adopted this report and recommendation
and denied the petition.
Jackson appealed, and we granted her request for a
certificate of probable cause.

The sole issue on this appeal is

whether sufficient evidence supported Jackson's conviction on
charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of
a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.

Inasmuch as

the district court relied on the state court record, we exercise
plenary review of the district court's order on this appeal.
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 280 (1991).

We do not consider

the effect of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which Congress enacted
while this appeal was pending, because even under prior law,
which may have been less deferential to the state court
proceedings than now would be the case, (see Berryman v. Morton,
F.3d

, 1996 WL 659354 at *16 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 1996)),

Jackson is not entitled to habeas relief.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), prior to its redesignation
as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) and its amendment by section 104 of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a federal
court presumes that state court findings of fact are correct if
the following requirements are met:

there was (1) a hearing on

the merits of a factual issue, (2) with findings made by a state
court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a proceeding to which the
petitioner and the state were parties, (4) and the findings are
evidenced by a written finding or opinion, or other reliable and
adequate written indicia.

See also Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d

247, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988, 112
S.Ct. 1679 (1992).

This presumption of correctness applies

unless the state court's factual determinations are not fairly
supported by the record.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8).

Thus, section

2254(d) "'reflect[ed] a clear congressional policy favoring
deference to state findings of fact absent good cause for
rejecting such findings.'"

Reese, 946 F.2d at 256 (quoting

Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Federal courts, however, do not accord deference under
section 2254(d) to state court legal rulings.

See McAleese v.

Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1028, 114 S.Ct. 645 (1993).

Similarly, federal courts are not

bound by any ultimate legal conclusion reached by a state court
in deciding a mixed question of law and fact.

Deputy v. Taylor,

19 F.3d 1485, 1494 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2730
(1994).

Of course, the "specific historical facts found by a

state court in the course of deciding [a mixed question] are
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subject to deference by § 2254(d) unless they are not supported
by the record."

Id. at 1494-95.

As we have indicated, the sole issue in this case is
whether there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson's
conviction of possession of a controlled substance and possession
of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.

Fourteenth

Amendment due process guarantees protect an individual from
"suffer[ing] the onus of a criminal conviction except upon
sufficient proof--defined as evidence necessary to convince a
trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every
element of the offense."

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316,

99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979).

In a federal habeas corpus

proceeding where sufficiency of the evidence is at issue, Jackson
v. Virginia sets forth the applicable standard:
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a criminal conviction
. . . . does not require a court to 'ask
itself whether it believes that the evidence
at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.' . . . Instead, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in the original).
The parties agree that the prosecution could not prove
that Jackson had actual possession of the cocaine because the
drugs were found in her apartment, and not on her person.

Thus,

the prosecution sought to prove that Jackson had constructive
possession of the cocaine.

As defined by the Pennsylvania
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Supreme Court, constructive possession of contraband is conscious
dominion over the illegal substance, the power to control it, and
the intent to exercise the control.

Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507

A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 507 A.2d
819, 820-21 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132,
134 (Pa. 1983).

Since determining whether a defendant had

constructive possession of contraband is not amenable to "bright
line" tests, Carroll, 507 A.2d at 821, the finder of fact may
infer an intent to maintain a conscious dominion from the
totality of the circumstances.

Macolino, 469 A.2d at 134.

In Macolino, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that
the defendant husband had equal access to, and thus constructive
possession of, contraband found in the bedroom he shared with his
wife.

Id. at 135-36.

The court found constructive possession in

Carroll when the police found contraband in the hotel room that
the defendant husband shared with his wife.
821.

Carroll, 507 A.2d at

Finally in Mudrick, in finding that the defendant

constructively possessed contraband found in the bedroom he
shared with his fiancee, the court stated, "[w]e hold today that
even absent a marital relationship constructive possession may be
found in either or both actors if contraband is found in an area
of joint control and equal access."

Mudrick, 507 A.2d at 1214.

In contrast to these three cases, it is more difficult to prove a
constructive possession case if the prosecution does not
demonstrate that the defendant resides in the home where the
police recover the contraband.

See Commonwealth v. Valette, 613
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A.2d 548 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 618 A.2d 1007
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
While naturally the facts with respect to whether a
defendant has constructive possession of contraband vary in each
case, in Commonwealth v. Aviles, 615 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 78 (1994), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the defendant had
constructive possession of the drugs in a case similar to this
one.

Consequently, Aviles is a significant precedent on this

appeal.

There the defendant, Aviles, leased a rowhouse in which

she subleased the middle and rear bedrooms to her sister and
brother-in-law.
front bedroom.

Aviles slept with her three children in the
During a search, the police found drugs and drug

paraphernalia in the middle and rear bedrooms.

The Superior

Court found that Aviles had access to all the bedrooms, stating
that she was, after all, the lessee.

Id. at 403.

cited additional facts to support the conviction:

The court also
an informant

had witnessed Aviles's sister and brother-in-law engaging in drug
activities at the residence; Aviles was present at the time of
the search; and the bedrooms containing the drugs were next to
defendant's bedroom.

Id.

Under the recent interpretations of Pennsylvania law by
state courts, the findings of fact made in Jackson's case
sufficiently support her conviction of constructive possession of
drugs.

Jackson admitted that she was the sole lessee of the

apartment, and the police found proof of her residency in the
form of a telephone bill, an electric bill, and a lease, all in
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Jackson's name.

Furthermore, in the face of conflicting

testimony between a police officer and Jackson, the state trial
court found credible the officer's testimony that the rear
bedroom, the room in which the police found the drugs, which
Jackson's brother used, was not locked.

Also, it is not disputed

that at the time the police executed the warrant only Jackson and
her infant son were in the apartment so that her brother could
not have excluded her at the time if she sought to enter the rear
bedroom.
Accordingly, the trial judge reasonably found that
Jackson had access to and control of all areas of the apartment,
including the rear bedroom.

In addition, the trial judge

considered the following facts with respect to Jackson's intent
to control the contraband:

(1) the ice chest containing the

drugs belonged to Jackson; and (2) the police found drug
paraphernalia, e.g., weight scales, a heat sealer, thousands of
empty vials and packets, and a loaded shotgun, in the kitchen
cabinet and the closet that Jackson shared with her brother.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge found
Jackson guilty of constructive possession and constructive
possession with intent to distribute.

Commonwealth v. Jackson,

No. 8901-0957, slip op. at 2-6.
We point out that the finding by the state trial judge
that Jackson owned the ice chest is unassailable.

Even though on

the appeal she argues that she had discarded the ice chest before
the police executed the warrant, Jackson testified at the trial
that she owned the ice chest when she first moved into the
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apartment.

While she testified that after she acquired a

refrigerator she had no further need for the ice chest, she also
testified that "I didn't give the ice chest to anyone.

I just

put the ice chest aside because I was no longer using it."
Clearly, she never gave the ice chest to her brother for she did
not even know that he was using it.
We recognize that Jackson testified that her younger
brother, John, used the rear bedroom, while she and her son
shared the front bedroom.

Furthermore, we realize that the

police did not find any drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons in
Jackson's bedroom or on her person.

Thus, Jackson understandably

contrasts her relationship with her brother to the familial
relationships of the defendants with other co-tenants in
Macolino, Carroll, and Mudrick, asserting that the state failed
to present evidence that her brother's bedroom was anything other
than a private place subject to his exclusive control.

In

Aviles, however, the Superior Court found that the defendant was
in constructive possession of the drugs in a situation in which
the defendant owned or leased and lived in the residence where
the drugs were found.
Although Jackson v. Virgina sets forth a federal test
for sufficiency of the evidence which is applicable in habeas
corpus proceedings, federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings
nevertheless look to the evidence the state considers adequate to
meet the elements of a crime governed by state law.

See Brumley

v. Detella, 83 F.3d 856, 862-65 (7th Cir. 1996); Chalmers v.
Mitchell, 73 F.3d 1262, 1272-73 (2d Cir.) (deferring to state's
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view of what constituted sufficient evidence to convict on state
crimes), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 106 (1996).

Pennsylvania

considers being a lessee or owner of the residence an important
factor in establishing dominion and control over the contraband.
While it is true that the police found the drugs in Jackson's
brother's bedroom, the significance of this circumstance is
diluted by the facts that the bedroom was unlocked, Jackson and
only her young son were present when the police executed the
warrant, the ice chest containing the drugs belonged to Jackson,
and the drug paraphernalia and a shotgun were located in the
closet next to Jackson's bedroom and in the kitchen cabinets.
Overall, we are constrained to conclude there was sufficient
evidence for any rational trier of fact to find the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In reaching our result, we have not overlooked United
States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814 (3d Cir. 1996), and United States
v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1017, 114
S.Ct. 615 (1993).

Jenkins and Brown were direct appeals in drug

constructive possession cases in which we found that the evidence
was not sufficient to sustain convictions.

These cases, however,

are distinguishable from this one on the facts.

In Jenkins, the

defendant was in a very different situation than Jackson, as he
was charged with constructive possession of drugs in an apartment
of which he was not the lessee, a point we emphasized in our
opinion.

90 F.3d at 816, 820.

Similarly, in Brown the appellant

was charged with constructive possession of drugs in a house to
which she had access or in which she resided, but which she
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neither owned nor leased.

Furthermore, none of the Brown

appellant's possessions were found in rooms where drugs were
seized.
Jackson's situation was different because she was the
lessee of the apartment and had access to all parts of it,
circumstances which logically tend to support a conclusion that
she had constructive possession of the apartment's contents.

In

addition, unlike in Jenkins and Brown, the police found the drugs
in this case in a container, i.e., the ice chest, that Jackson
owned.
Jenkins and Brown also differ from this case in another
important respect.

In Jenkins when the police entered the

apartment there were adults other than the appellant inside, and
in Brown when the police entered the house the appellant was not
even there.

Rather, there was another adult in the house and the

appellant came upon the scene later.

Jackson's situation was

different because, as we already have pointed out, except for her
young son, she was alone in the apartment when the police
executed the warrant.

Of course, she had ready access to the

drugs as they were in the unlocked rear bedroom.
These facts, as well as the other facts we have set
forth, made it reasonable for the trial court as the trier of
fact to conclude that Jackson had conscious dominion and control
over the contraband found in the apartment, and thus we would
affirm in this case even if we were deciding this case on appeal
from a district court conviction.

It therefore follows that we

would be overreaching if we reversed the denial of Jackson's
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In these circumstances, we

have no need to consider whether there is a range of constructive
possession cases in which on the same facts we would reverse
convictions under federal law but would deny habeas corpus
petitions challenging confinement following state convictions.
See Brumley, 83 F.3d 856; Chalmers, 73 F.3d 1262.

In principle,

arguably there could be such a group of cases, as the distinction
simply would reflect differences in the definition of what
conduct constituted constructive possession under state and
federal law.

Cf. Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 291 (In a habeas

corpus proceeding following a state conviction "we do not
exercise the supervisory power that we might possess on an appeal
from a conviction in the district court.").
In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the order of
December 15, 1995.

CHRISTINE JACKSON v. MARY LEFTRIDGE BYRD, SUPERINTENDENT;
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR PHILADELPHIA COUNTY; THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, No. 95-2118

BECKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The term "constructive possession" has a precise legal
meaning, which does not differ between federal and state (here
Pennsylvania) law.

To constructively possess a controlled

substance one must have conscious dominion or control over it,
and intend to exercise that dominion or control.

United States

v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 817-18 (3d. Cir. 1996); United States v.
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Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v. Mudrick,
507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 507 A.2d
819, 820-21 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132,
134 (Pa. 1983).

In my view, the evidence in this case will not,

as a matter of due process, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979), support the conviction of Christine Jackson for
constructive possession of the cocaine contained within the ice
chest in her brother's room.

I therefore dissent.

I turn first

to an analysis of the record, and then to the legal issues.

I.
A.
The linchpin of the majority opinion is its conclusion
that Jackson, because she was the lessee of the apartment, had
access to and control of all areas of the apartment, including
the rear bedroom used by her brother, and hence of the ice chest
and the cocaine.

In my view, this conclusion is supported by

neither the law nor the facts.
The Commonwealth has cited no case establishing, as a
matter of real property law or otherwise, that a lessee can enter
his or her sublessee's room at will.

Nor does the record suggest

such entry or access as a matter of fact, only the contrary.
Finally, and most importantly, there is nothing in the record
that reflects a conscious intention by Jackson to exercise
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dominion or control over the bedroom or the drugs, or from which
such an intention could be inferred.
The state trial judge made much of the fact that the
ice chest "belonged" to Jackson, but the uncontradicted evidence
is that she had discarded it when she got a refrigerator and did
not know that her brother was using it to store drugs.

Although

the police found the door to her brother's room unlocked (Jackson
had always thought that it was locked), there is no evidence that
she was ever in the room, much less knew what its contents were.
None of Jackson's possessions was found in her brother's
bedroom, nor were her fingerprints detected on any of the drugs
or other items seized.
There was, to be sure, some drug paraphernalia and a
shotgun in a common area of the apartment.

But shotguns are not

the weapon of choice among drug dealers, and thus cannot
inherently support an inference of drug possession.

And the drug

paraphernalia, even if Jackson knew about it, is simply not
enough to link Jackson to the cocaine in her brother's room or to
any kind of drug dealing, given the absence of other inculpatory
facts.

And it surely does not supply evidence of conscious

dominion or control.

Indeed, while the drug paraphernalia in the

kitchen cabinet and closet may logically demonstrate that
Jackson's brother had dominion and control over the common areas
of the apartment, it does not suggest that Jackson had dominion
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or control over the bedroom which, on this record, was subject to
her brother's exclusive, private use.
B.
The case that the majority puts most stock in, and on
which its position essentially stands or falls, is Commonwealth
v. Aviles, 615 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (in banc), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 78 (1994).

I find Aviles of little value.

Aviles was a 5-4 decision of an intermediate appellate court
(which is not entitled to deference, but only to weight if it is
persuasive, which, I think, it is not).

It was not cited in

either the majority or the dissenting opinion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in this case.1

I note in this regard that

Jackson's conviction was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in a 3-3 vote.

Justice Zappala's forceful dissent, which

articulates the same concerns that I express herein, was joined
by Justice Cappy and (now Chief) Justice Flaherty, so that of the
current Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices, the vote was 3-2 in
favor of Jackson.

I do not believe that Aviles would be approved

by Pennsylvania's present high court.
It seems clear to me that under our jurisprudence, see,
e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814 (3d Cir. 1996), and
United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 1993), the evidence
against Jackson would be insufficient to sustain a conviction
1. It is also not even cited by the Commonwealth in its present
brief.
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based on constructive possession.

The facts in Brown are similar

to the facts in Jackson's case: acting on a tip, the police
searched Brown's home for drugs.

During the search, Ama

Baltimore arrived at the house, inserted a key into the lock, and
was arrested as she entered.

She protested, "But you can't

arrest me because I am in my own house."

In the upstairs sewing

room, the police found a pair of shorts and a switchblade, both
of which Baltimore admitted were hers.

Large quantities of

heroin, cocaine powder, and crack cocaine were found in the
refrigerator in the kitchen, the kitchen closet, and one of the
upstairs bedrooms.

Equipment and supplies to prepare, cook, cut,

and distribute the drugs were also found in the bedroom.
This Court overturned Baltimore's conviction for
insufficient evidence of possession, holding that, although the
evidence showed that she had access to, or resided in the house
and knew of the presence of the drugs, it did not, without more,
establish that she had conscious dominion or control over the
drugs.

Brown, 3 F.3d at 682-83.

"[M]ere proximity to the drug

or mere presence on the property where it is located or mere
association with the person who does control the drug or the
property, is insufficient to support a finding of possession."
Id. at 680 (citing United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1036
(3d Cir. 1972)).
We further noted that neither Baltimore, nor any of her
possessions, were found in any of the rooms where the drugs were

5

seized, none of her fingerprints was found on any of the drugs or
drug paraphernalia, and there was no other evidence that she ever
exerted any control over the drugs or drug paraphernalia.
683.

Id. at

The facts in Brown, we believed, supported the conclusion

that she had access to or resided at the residence, but not that
she exercised control over the drugs.

Id. at 682.

Similarly, in the instant case, aside from the tenuous
link sought to be drawn from the discarded ice chest and drug
paraphernalia, nothing in the record supports a finding of
constructive possession.

As stated previously, none of Jackson's

possessions was found in her brother's bedroom, nor were her
fingerprints detected on any of the drugs or other items seized.
In fact, the evidence in Jackson's case is merely consistent
with her access to or residence at the apartment, but with no
control over the drugs.

See Brown, 3 F.3d at 681 (concluding

that while the evidence may be sufficient to show that Baltimore
was residing at the home and knew that the drugs were in the
house, the evidence did not support a finding that she exercised
dominion or control over the drugs).

Hence, I disagree with the

majority's position that the facts in Jackson's case meet the
federal constructive possession standard.
II.
Although it does not expressly so hold, the majority
nonetheless seems to intimate that the legal sufficiency standard
on habeas corpus is somehow different (and diluted) when a state
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rather than federal conviction is at issue.

The majority

explicitly disclaims such a holding, suggesting that it would
apply a unitary standard:
In these circumstances, we have no need to consider whether there
is a range of constructive possession cases in which on
the same facts we would reverse convictions under
federal law but would deny habeas corpus petitions
challenging confinement following state convictions.
See Brumley, 83 F.3d 856; Chalmers, 73 F.3d 1262. In
principle, arguably there could be such a group of
cases, as the distinction simply would reflect
differences in the definition of what conduct
constituted constructive possession under state and
federal law. Cf. Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 291 (In a
habeas corpus proceeding following a state conviction
"we do not exercise the supervisory power that we might
possess on an appeal from a conviction in the district
court.").
I applaud the disclaimer, but find it elusive and unconvincing.
I draw this conclusion because if a unitary standard is, in fact,
being imposed, the majority has strayed from (or diluted) the
federal cases.

I think it important to make clear in this regard

that, for the Jackson v. Virginia analysis, there can be no
difference in the definition of what conduct constitutes
constructive possession.
As previously noted, Pennsylvania's definition of
"constructive possession" is identical to the federal definition.
While it is true that federal courts have sometimes deferred to
states and their interpretations of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to convict on state crimes, see Brumley v. Detella, 83
F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996); Moore v. Deputy Commissioner of SCIHuntingdon, 946 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1991), these were instances in

7

which the federal courts looked strictly at state law because
there was no analogous federal statute.
Mitchell, 73 F.3d 1262 (2d Cir. 1996).

But see Chalmers v.
Jackson's appeal,

however, is distinguishable since, in addition to state law,
federal case law has also defined and interpreted constructive
possession.
As stated above, I believe that the evidence in
Jackson's case is insufficient to meet the federal and state
definitions of constructive possession.

But even if

Pennsylvania's standard for constructive possession were lower
(which it is not), it would be incorrect and manifestly unjust
for the disposition of Jackson's appeal to differ depending on
the forum, state or federal, because evidence that fails to meet
federal due process standards in a federal forum should be
insufficient to meet the guarantees of federal due process in a
state court.

In other words, regardless of the forum in which

the case is heard, the standard for satisfying federal due
process should be uniform.

This is especially true in light of

the fact that the federal and state statutes for possession of
drugs are similar, the definitions of constructive possession are
identical, and the (federal) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 304
(1979), standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence is
perforce the overarching standard.

I also note, moreover, that

the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in
Pennsylvania is identical to the federal Jackson v. Virginia
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standard.

Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1232

(3d Cir. 1991).
III.
Because there is an absence of facts justifying an
inference that Jackson had conscious dominion or control over the
contraband, or that she intended to exercise that dominion or
control, as a matter of due process this conviction should not
stand.

Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's denial

of habeas corpus relief.
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